In their comment, Jungherr, Jürgens, and Schoen (2010) challenged part of the results presented in our original article (Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, & Welpe, 2010) . The present response addresses their points of concern and demonstrates that the conclusions drawn in Tumasjan et al. (2010) are well supported by both data and analyses.
importantly-our selection of parties and politicians exactly followed the selection of all major German election forecast institutes (i.e., Allensbach, Emnid, Forsa, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, GMS, and Infratest dimap) who regularly report forecasting data (see e.g., Zicht & Cantow, 2010) . Thus, in order to ensure comparability of our data with those of the major German forecasting institutes, we chose exactly the same selection of parties that are reported by name in the forecasts of those institutes, while excluding all other parties for which those institutes report only an aggregated percentage under the label ''others. '' Third, following the sample selection criteria outlined above we argue -in contrast to JSS -that the exclusion rather than the inclusion of the Pirate Party is a more obvious a priori choice, given that they were neither represented in the German parliament nor specifically reported by name in the major election forecasts at the time of our study. By arbitrarily including the Pirate Party in their analyses, JJS build their argument exclusively on one exceptional outlier that has received shortterm media attention in 2009. 2 However, before and after the 2009 electoral campaign, the Pirate Party has not received any more attention than any other of the German splinter parties. Hence, it remains theoretically and methodologically questionable to arbitrarily include only this particular party, while at the same time excluding all the other 20 (splinter) parties (e.g., ''Allianz der Mitte,'' ''Freie Wähler Deutschland,'' ''Deutsche Kommunistische Partei,'' ''Die Violetten,'' ''Partei Bibeltreuer Christen,'' ''Rentner'') that have likewise run for parliament in the 2009 federal elections. To be consistent with their argument, JJS should have collected and analyzed data on all 27 parties that ran for parliament in 2009. 3 However, in their response, they unfortunately do not specify their rationale underlying the selection of only one additional seventh party, while excluding all remaining 20 parties. It would be rather interesting and illuminative to see the prediction results when data on all 27 parties are analyzed. Moreover, we want to call attention to JJS's selection of keywords which they used to compile their data set as well as the classification of keywords to mentions of the respective party. For instance, while the classification of many keywords is straightforward (e.g., ''cdu,'' ''spd,'' ''gruene/grüne'' would all be classified as mentions of the respective party CDU, SPD, and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), it is unclear which party the keyword ''zensursula'' 4 was assigned to. Since JJS do not specify the assignment of their keywords to party counts, we can only speculate about the classification of, for instance, the keyword ''zensursula.'' Since the ''zensursula'' campaign was mainly led by the Pirate Party, it could be that JJS counted this keyword as a Pirate Party mention (which could also partly account for the high number of Pirate Party mentions they found). However, this Twitter keyword can by no means be exclusively counted as a mention of the Pirate Party, since it was also heavily used by supporters of other parties (e.g., the Green party). Hence, while JJS are concerned that we ''do not specify several details and make arbitrary choices without giving any substantive account'' (Jungherr et al., 2010) , their own analyses are highly intransparent due to lacking specification and substantiation of data collection and analysis details.
Fourth, JJS claim that our ''method is dependent on public opinion surveys'' and can therefore ''hardly complement traditional methods of political forecasting'' (Jungherr et al., 2010) . However, in our article we explicitly maintain that analyzing Twitter sentiment may ''complement''-rather than ''replace''-traditional methods of political forecasting. At this point, we also want to clarify our method of data collection, since JJS were concerned about the exact data collection method that we applied. We collected our data by time-interval load balanced queries using the Twitter REST API. As outlined in our article, we ''systematically collected all tweets that contained the names of either the six parties represented in the German parliament (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, B90/Die Grünen, and Die Linke) or those politicians of these parties who are regularly included in a weekly survey on the popularity of politicians conducted by the research institute 'Forschungsgruppe Wahlen''' (Tumasjan et al., 2010, p. 5) . Overall, then, we conclude that JJS's arbitrary inclusion of the Pirate Party and their assignment of keywords to party mentions in their data set remain unclear and unsubstantiated.
The second issue that JJS are concerned about pertains to the sampling period of our data and the resulting replicability of our results. In their response, JJS argue that the mean absolute error (MAE) of predictions varies with the sample period. Their replications using different sampling time frames indicate that the maximum MAE across seven sampling periods is 3.34 percentage points (M ¼ 2.07, SD ¼ 0.61, range: 1.51-3.34), whereas the MAE of our analysis is 1.65 percentage points. 5 In the following, we respond to their critique in detail. First, it comes as no surprise that the MAE varies with the sampling period because increasing the number of measurements (or, for instance, the length of a test) generally decreases the sampling random error. Indeed, the Pearson correlation between the number of days in the sampling period and the MAE in JJS's replication (see their Table  3 ) reveals a clear association (r ¼ À.64) between the two, indicating that the MAE decreases with an increasing sampling period. This result shows that sampling over a longer period does, indeed, result in an overall more accurate prediction. Thus, the varying MAEs that JJS found are a normal result of any empirical research and no particularity of our study.
Second, in the context of political campaigns, it is both absolutely obvious and expected that the results ''depend considerably on the period under scrutiny'' (Jungherr et al., 2010) . This is also the case with any traditional polls, since, obviously, the political sentiment in the population changes over time due to the influence of behaviors and statements of politicians (e.g., speeches, affairs) and political parties (e.g., resolutions, campaigns), especially during an election campaign. On the contrary, it would be rather unrealistic to expect exactly the same results completely independent of the time frame. Nevertheless, as JJS's replication of our analyses demonstrates, the results pattern that we found does not change substantially across different time frames, which, as will be demonstrated in the following, rather speaks in favor of our results.
Third, we argue that the maximum MAE of 3.34 percentage points found by JJS in a sampling period of just two (!) days as well as the fairly constant results pattern underlines rather than questions the robustness of our results. We argue that the maximum MAE is relatively low given the fairly simple count method (as used in previous studies, e.g., Asur & Huberman, 2010) and the extremely short sampling period, especially when taking into account the accuracy of much more sophisticated, expensive, and time-consuming methods of traditional polls. Thus, as outlined above, we see the analysis of Twitter sentiment more as a ''fast and frugal'' (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1996, p. 3) , and, thus, somewhat less accurate method which can indeed only -as we clearly state in our original article -''complement'', but in no case ''replace'' traditional forecasting methods.
Fourth, although the forecasting quality of Twitter messages is certainly the most arguable part of our article, it is by no means the main focus and, least of all, the only argument that we put forth. The main argument of our article is the much more general notion that the content of Twitter messages can be regarded as a valid indicator of public opinion that plausibly reflects offline political sentiment (rather than the fact that it can always be used to accurately forecast election results and replace traditional polls). As we point out in our original manuscript, our results show that ''Twitter can be considered a valid indicator of the political landscape off-line'' (Tumasjan et al., 2010, p. 13) .
Fifth, we fully agree with JJS that it would indeed be desirable to extend the sampling period in such research. However, as in all empirical research, we had to make a sampling period selection decision based on certain criteria as will be outlined in the following. We chose August 13, 2009, as the beginning of our sampling period because prior to that date there were simply too few Twitter messages with party and politician mentions to assure robust analyses. We set the end of our sampling period on September 19, 2009, 1 week before the actual elections, because most forecasting institutes also do not publish any poll results already well in advance of federal elections. Thus, this date was chosen in order to ensure comparability of our results with the major German forecasting institutes and to test the predictive quality of Twitter messages' content. Most important, there was and is no reason to expect entirely different results or result patterns as is demonstrated by JJS's replication.
